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Abstract
Prior research has shown that sell-side analysts in general, and especially those facing conflicts
of interest driven by investment bank relationships, issue overly optimistic recommendations. This
paper studies the eﬀect of regulations on sell-side analysts’ research. These regulations — Rule NASD
2711, Rule NYSE 472, and the “Global Analyst Research Settlement” — attempted to mitigate the
interdependence between the research and the investment bank departments of US brokerage houses.
The results suggest that the regulations have partially achieved their goal of curbing the conflicts of
interest’s influence over analysts’ stock recommendations. After the adoption of the new regulations,
the likelihood of receiving an optimistic recommendation no longer depends on whether the firm
had undergone IPO/SEO or whether the brokerage house had participated in any such IPO/SEO
as an underwriter. However, analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations for
IPO/SEO firms, and aﬃliated analysts are even more reluctant to be pessimistic about these stocks.
We also report an overall change in the distribution of recommendations issued by brokerage houses
after the new regulations took eﬀect, in which they leaned towards less optimistic recommendations.
∗Ohad Kadan (kadan@wustl.edu), Rong Wang (wangr@wustl.edu) and Tzachi Zach (zach@wustl.edu) are with John
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, academic studies and the financial press have pointed to sell-side research that
is tainted by conflicts of interest stemming from the relationship between investment banking (IB)
and research departments.1 In recent years, regulators have expressed concern that analysts were de-
liberately misleading investors and, during the summer of 2001, the US Congress held hearings titled
“Analyzing the Analysts.” Changes in the regulatory environment, however, did not begin until July
2002, when the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) NASD and NYSE issued new regulations on
sell-side research. In December 2002, the Global Analyst Research Settlement (“Global Settlement”),
involving the sell-side research of the top ten US investment banks (the big 10), was formally an-
nounced. The purpose of these regulations was to curb the conflicts of interests that aﬀected analysts’
research by substantially limiting relations between the research and investment banking departments.
This study investigates the impact of these regulatory changes on analysts’ behavior. Were the regu-
lations eﬀective in mitigating the eﬀects of the conflicts of interest?
The general view in the academic literature is that analysts are, on average, biased towards provid-
ing favorable and positive information regarding the firms they cover.2 Moreover, aﬃliated analysts,
whose employer has business relations with the covered firm, are shown to be more biased than unaﬃl-
iated analysts. The evidence demonstrating the diﬀerential bias of aﬃliated analysts over unaﬃliated
analysts is both in the context of Initial Public Oﬀerings (Michaely and Womack, 1999) and Seasoned
Equity Oﬀerings (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998).3 The strong academic evidence
of conflicts of interest is supported by numerous anecdotes about analysts’ practices. Analysts had
been frequently used by investment banks as a tool to attract business (e.g. Krigman, Shaw and
Womack, 2001). As a result, analysts’ compensation was tied to the amount of investment banking
business they helped generate. Analysts actively participated in road shows and pitches and coverage
1Examples in the financial press include “Wall Street Grows Treacherous for Analysts Who Speak Out,” Wall Street
Journal, April 5, 1990, p. C1; “Merrill Alters a Policy on Analysts,” Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2001, p. C1; “Under
Pressure: At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to Soften Harsh Views,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1992, p.
A1; “Incredible Buys: Many Companies Press Analysts to Steer Clear of Negative Ratings,” Wall Street Journal, July
19, 1995, p. A1; “Jack of All Trades: How One Top Analyst Vaults ‘Chinese Walls’ to Do Deals for Firm,” Wall Street
Journal, March 25, 1997, p. A1; “Shoot All the Analysts,” Financial Times, March 20, 2001, p. 22; “Where Mary Meeker
Went Wrong,” Fortune, May 14, 2001, pp. 68-82; “Outlook for Analysts: Skepticism and Blame,” Wall Street Journal,
June 13, 2001, p. C1; “The Real Telecom Scandal,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2002, p. A16.
2See Kothari (2001) pp. 152-160 for a review of this literature.
3These studies mainly demonstrate a bias in stock recommendations. The evidence is less conclusive with respect to
other research outputs such as earnings forecasts (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Cowen et al., 2003), price targets (Cowen et
al., 2003) and long-term earnings growth forecasts (Lin and McNichols, 1998 find weak evidence while Dechow et al.’s,
2000, evidence is stronger). Other studies of conflicts of interest in sell-side research are Boni and Womack (2002a), Iskoz
(2003), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003), Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan (2004), Barber, Lehavy and
Trueman (2005) and Agrawal and Chen (2005).
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decisions were largely aﬀected by investment banking considerations. In describing the behavior of
one of its participants, the Global Settlement states that “pressure on analysts to assist in obtaining
investment banking deals and to maintain banking relationships adversely aﬀected the integrity of
analysts’ reports (. . . ) regarding companies that were investment banking clients” (Lehman Brothers’
Letter of AWC - Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, p. 3).
The stock market crash of 2000-2001 triggered the concerns that investors were being misled
by analysts’ biased research. While these concerns could be dismissed on the grounds that any bias
would be adjusted for by rational investors, there is some evidence to suggest otherwise. Theoretically,
sophisticated agents might be able to exploit other agents’ naïve behavior (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson,
2004). In the context of this paper, there is evidence that heterogeneous investors use sell-side research
diﬀerently, with retail investors acting naively by failing to adjust for clear biases in analysts’ stock
recommendations (Boni and Womack, 2002b, 2003, Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2004).
In this paper, we ask whether and how the regulations aﬀected analysts’ practices and how the
market reacted to any changes in analysts’ behavior, focusing mainly on the conflicts of interest
arising from the relationship between research and investment banking departments. To answer these
questions, we analyze stock recommendations and price reactions in the period before the regulations
(the Pre-Reg period), and the period after the regulations (the Post-Reg period). As a main proxy for
the presence of conflicts of interest, we use the past underwriting relationship between the brokerage
house and the recommended firm. In addition, we also compare recommendations issued for firms that
underwent an IPO or an SEO in the recent past with recommendations issued for firms that did not
undergo an IPO or an SEO.
Our paper is related to a recent study by Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2005). They focus on
whether the argument made by regulators regarding conflicts of interest aﬀecting stock recommen-
dations was warranted. As a result, their analysis is concentrated on the period prior to the new
regulations. In contrast, we investigate whether the new regulations were successful in aﬀecting ana-
lysts’ behavior by comparing recommendations in the periods prior to and after the regulations.
We report significant changes in how conflicts of interest influence stock recommendations in the
Post-Reg period. We corroborate the concerns of regulators by showing that conflicts of interest were
in fact associated with excess optimism in the Pre-Reg period. Ceteris paribus, in the Pre-Reg period
the odds of issuing an optimistic recommendation increased by 40% for stocks that have undergone an
IPO or an SEO in the recent past and by an additional 12% if the recommendation was issued by an
aﬃliated analyst. Both eﬀects largely vanished after the regulations. In the Post-Reg period analysts
are not more likely to issue optimistic recommendations for IPO or SEO firms and aﬃliated analysts
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are not more likely to issue optimistic recommendations compared to unaﬃliated analysts.
In contrast, conflicts of interest might still be influencing the issuance of pessimistic recommen-
dations. In both the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods, analysts are reluctant to issue pessimistic rec-
ommendations for IPO/SEO firms, and aﬃliated analysts are even more reluctant to be pessimistic
about these stocks. Furthermore, we document a reversal in the behavior of analysts employed by the
brokerage houses that participated in the Global Settlement. While prior to the regulations these bro-
kerage houses were less likely to issue pessimistic recommendations, in the Post-Reg period, they are
more likely to issue such recommendations, compared to the brokerage houses that did not participate
in the settlement.
Results on market reactions are consistent with the idea that rational markets should be able to
discount biased optimism. Before the regulations, prior studies show that the market recognized the
excess optimism associated with the underwriting business by discounting recommendations coming
from brokerage houses with potential conflicts of interest at play, but, as in Michaely and Womack
(1999), the adjustment for the bias was only partial. After regulations were adopted, and consistent
with the elimination of excess optimism linked to underwriting relationships, there are no detrimental
eﬀects on market reactions to optimistic recommendations issued by brokerage houses with potential
conflicts of interest. In particular, in the Post-Reg period, post-event returns do not diﬀer between
recommendations issued by analysts with varying conflicts of interest, suggesting that investors have
been correctly adjusting at event time for any bias that might persist in the recommendations.
We also report significant changes in the overall distribution of analysts’ stock recommendations
between the two periods.4 Prior to the regulations, 61% of the recommendations were optimistic
(“strong buy” and “buy”) while pessimistic recommendations (“underperform” and “sell”) were very
rare (4.2% of the sample). The distribution of recommendations in the Post-Reg period is much less
skewed. Optimistic recommendations now constitute about 43% of the population, while pessimistic
recommendations have almost tripled - to about 12%. The diﬀerence between the two periods is even
more remarkable for the subsample of recommendations issued by the 10 brokerage houses that were
part of the Global Settlement. For them, there is roughly a balanced distribution between optimistic
and pessimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period.
The shift in the cross-sectional distribution of stock recommendations could be caused by a change
in the way analysts apply optimistic assumptions in their valuation models. A reduction in the use of
4These results complement Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2005), who provide evidence regarding the
distribution of stock recommendations using data from 1996 to mid-2003. They show that analysts are reluctant to issue
bad recommendations, but that this tendency is mitigated starting in 2000. They attribute part of the change to NASD
Rule 2711, which requires that brokers’ ratings distribution be made public.
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optimistic assumptions leads to more moderate valuations, which then shift the stock recommenda-
tions’ distribution. A second, non-mutually exclusive explanation for the shift in the recommendations’
distribution is that brokerage houses reclassified their recommendations. Indeed, many brokerage
houses adopted a new rating system at around the time the regulations were put into place. With this
new rating system, brokerage houses completely reshuﬄed their portfolio of stock recommendations
in one single day. We show that this reshuﬄe came about mostly through downgrading the then out-
standing recommendations. Based on our results, we believe that both explanations have an empirical
validity.
The changes in market reactions to stock recommendations across the periods are consistent with
the observed changes in stock recommendations. For example, a decrease in optimism implies that
optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period are restricted to a smaller subset of firms, with
relatively better prospects than optimistically-rated stocks in the Pre-Reg period. Investors seem to
understand this, as event reactions to optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period are about
80% stronger than those in the Pre-Reg period. We also corroborate anecdotal evidence that, prior
to the regulations, brokerage houses used to aggregate stocks with pessimistic prospects under the
“hold” recommendation level. After the regulations, the big 10 brokerage houses seem to “mean what
they say” when they distribute stocks between “hold” and “sell” recommendations, as revealed by
market reactions that correctly impose a negative tone solely on the explicitly pessimistic (“sell”)
recommendations, but no longer so for “hold” recommendations (for non-Big 10 brokerage houses,
“sell” recommendations still seem to be disguised under “hold”). The attainment of correct naming of
ratings conforms to the objectives of the regulations - which, for example, prescribe that “definitions
of ratings terms also must be consistent with their plain meaning” and that a “‘hold’ rating should
not mean or imply that an investor should sell a security” (NASD Rule 472, p. 9). This works in
favor of retail investors, given the empirical evidence in Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2004) that
these investors were taking recommendations at face value.
Collectively, we view our findings as consistent with a significant eﬀect of the regulations on
analysts’ practices. First, analysts started using recommendation ratings more judiciously with the
adoption of the regulations. For example, “sell” recommendations are no longer disguised under the
“hold” umbrella. Second, regarding conflicts of interest linked to IB business, we observe a partial
achievement of the regulations’ objectives. The regulations were more successful in curbing the issuance
of optimistic recommendations by analysts facing potential conflicts of interest. However, we still find
evidence that these analysts are reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide some background on the
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regulatory changes. In section 3, we develop our hypotheses, and in section 4, we describe the data
used in this study. Section 5 examines general trends in analysts’ outputs following the regulations.
In section 6, we provide our main results by examining the diﬀerential behavior of analysts based on
conflicts of interest between research and investment banking departments. We conclude in section 7.
2 Institutional Background - The Regulations
During the summer of 2001, the US Congress held the “Analyzing the Analysts” hearings. Although
the congressional initiative did not result in specific outcomes in terms of regulatory practice, it helped
draw attention to the issue of conflicts of interests in brokerage house research. For example, Securities
and Exchange Commission Acting Chairman Laura Unger emphasized that: “It has become clear that
research analysts are subject to several influences that may aﬀect the integrity and the quality of their
analysis and recommendations. (. . . ) Analyst practices are now firmly in the spotlight. That spotlight
has exposed the conflicts analysts face. This exposure is beneficial for investors. (. . . ) I am hopeful
that recent industry initiatives will help to reduce or more eﬀectively manage the conflicts of interest
that threaten analysts’ fairness and objectivity. I am also optimistic that appropriate amendments
to SRO rules, coupled with vigilant enforcement of these rules, will improve disclosure of conflicts of
interest by firms and their analysts.”5
The hearings were followed by two pieces of closely related regulations. First, new rules were
enacted by NASD and NYSE (the SROs), aﬀecting virtually all brokerage houses operating in the
United States. The second regulatory intervention was the “Global Settlement” which applies directly
only to the 10 top brokerage houses but indirectly aﬀects all other brokerage houses as well. We describe
each one of them separately below, and later refer to them collectively “the regulations.”6
2.1 The SROs Regulations
In the summer of 2002, new rules for sell-side analysts became eﬀective through NYSE and NASD.
July 9, 2002 marked the start of the new rule 2711 in NASD and of the amended rule 472 in NYSE.
5See pages 228 to 240 of the Analyzing the Analysts Hearings of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, July 14; July 31, 2001, Serial No. 107-25. Documentation on the hearings can be obtained at
http://www.access.gpo.gov.
6The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of July 24th, 2002 also added to the increasing scrutiny of analysts. The Act mandates
that the SEC, either directly or indirectly through the SROs, adopt not later than one year after the enactment date
of the Act “rules reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend
equity securities in research reports and public appearances, in order to improve the objectivity of research and provide
investors with more useful and reliable information” (see SEC Release no. 34-47110 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
47110.htm).
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According to the SEC, “the NASD and NYSE rules, as amended, are substantially identical and are
intended to operate identically” (SEC Release No. 45908, p. 5); 7 they were adopted to complement
existing regulations that were both uncoordinated and insuﬃcient to address the growing complaints
from the public.
The main purpose of the SRO’s new rules was to sever the ties between investment banking (IB)
and research departments. Among other measures, the rules limit the relationships and communica-
tions between IB and research personnel, prohibit analyst compensation that is based on specific IB
transactions, prohibit the subject company from reviewing a research report before publication (except
for checking factual accuracy), and establish quiet periods during which a firm acting as manager or
co-manager of a securities oﬀering cannot issue research reports on the company issuing the securities.
The new rules also establish very stringent disclosure requirements for research reports. The
disclosure requirements are aimed at providing investors with better information to properly interpret
the research output, to be aware of the possibility that the research might be subject to conflicts
of interest and to verify, ex-post, its value. For example, along with the research report, a research
analyst has to disclose whether she received compensation based on IB’s revenue, whether she holds
a position as oﬃcer or director in the subject company, or whether the subject company is a client
of the firm. Finally, to make research output more meaningful and easily comparable across diﬀerent
analysts and firms, the rules prescribe that every research report must explain the meaning of its
rating system, disclose the percentage of all ratings as mapped to “buy,” “hold”and “sell” categories,
and provide a price chart that maps past prices of the recommended stock together with the points
at which ratings were assigned or reviewed.
2.2 The Global Settlement
In June 2001, the New York Attorney General began investigating Merrill Lynch following a Wall
Street Journal article about an alleged misconduct of security analysts. The initial evidence came
from a series of e-mail messages that revealed a discrepancy between analysts’ true opinions and
their recommendations. Contrary to favorable public reports by analysts about certain stocks, the
internal e-mails by those same analysts showed a clear dissatisfaction with the attractiveness of the
stocks. Following the Merrill Lynch investigation, the Attorney General conducted an investigation
of other investment banks for similar issues. Supposedly, from approximately mid-1999 through mid-
7SEC Release No. 45908, describing the approval of new the rules, can be found at www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/02-
21-app.pdf. A complete description of NYSE rule 472 can be found at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/rule472.pdf, and a
complete description of NASD rule 2711 and its amendments can be found at http://www.nasdr.com/filings/rf02-21.asp.
Boni and Womack (2002a) provide a good description of the steps leading to the SROs’ new rules as well as a discussion
of their main provisions.
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2001, investment banks engaged in practices that created or maintained inappropriate influence by
investment bankers over research analysts, thereby tainting research with conflicts of interest. These
allegations were neither admitted nor denied by the investment banks.
The investigations led to the “Global Settlement” between the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the
New York Attorney General, and ten of US top investment firms. The principles of the settlement
were announced on December 22, 2002, and the final settlement was oﬃcially enacted on April 28,
2003 (see NASD 2003).8
The Global Settlement’s objectives closely mirrored the SROs’ new regulations passed in the sum-
mer of 2002, most importantly with respect to severing the ties between IB and research departments.
Like the NASD 2711 and the NYSE 472 regulations, the Global Settlement included measures to
restrict the relationship between IB and research departments, and to impose stringent disclosure re-
quirements on the analysts’ research. In a few cases, the Global Settlement goes beyond the SROs’ new
rules: for example, it requires that the participants have their IB and research departments physically
separated and that the research department have a dedicated legal department.
Besides the regulatory measures on how sell-side research has to operate, the Global Settlement
required the ten firms that were included in the settlement to pay fines and penalties totaling roughly
$1.4 billion. Moreover, the settlement included a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (AWC)
from each participant that documented in rich detail many instances of conflicts of interest, violations
of NASD rules and firms’ internal policies, or simply fraudulent reports. Although the settlement
guaranteed that “NASD will not bring any future actions against respondent alleging violations based
on the same factual findings” contained in the AWC, it also said that the AWC “will become part
of Respondent’s permanent disciplinary record and may be considered in any future actions brought
by NASD, or any other regulator, against respondent” (J.P. Morgan’s Letter of AWC, p. 1). That
is, for the participants of the Global Settlement, misdeeds of the past were settled for the moment,
but repetitions of misdeeds in the future might lead to even harsher measures, given the documented
precedent to support a legal case.
3 Hypotheses Development
Our hypotheses focus on analysts’ stock recommendations in the period following the enactment of the
regulations (9/2002 — 12/2004), referred to as the Post-Reg period. We begin this period in September
8The ten investment firms included in the “Global Settlement” are: Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Credit Suisse First
Boston LLC, Goldman, Sachs & Co., Lehman Brothers Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., Citigroup Global Markets Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc., UBS
Warburg LLC and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaﬀray Inc.
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2002, immediately after the first set of rules was enacted. We compare analysts’ outputs in the Post-
Reg period to their outputs in the preceding period (11/2000-8/2002). We label it the Pre-Reg period.
We begin this period in November 2000 since Regulation FD, which was another substantial regulation
influencing analysts, was enacted in October 2000. Our aim is to gauge the eﬀect of the regulations
beyond what may have already been achieved due to Reg FD.9
Although brokerage houses produce many other pieces of information about stocks they track
(general research reports and forecasts on earnings, sales, growth, etc.), we mostly focus on the eﬀects
of the regulations on stock recommendations. First, recommendations were always the center point
of the complaints about conflicts of interest and of the demand for the regulations discussed above.
For example, the SEC describes the purpose of the regulations passed by NYSE and NASD as to
“address conflicts of interest that are raised when research analysts recommend securities in public
communications” (SEC Release no. 45908, p. 3). Moreover, recommendations seem to represent a
research output that is more binding. Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986) describe recommendations
as “one of the few cases in evaluating information content where the forecaster is recommending a clear
and unequivocal course of action rather than producing an estimate of a number, the interpretation
of which is up to the user” (p. 699).10
We provide two sets of hypotheses. The first is a set of general hypotheses dealing with overall
trends in recommendations and price reactions. The second set is related to conflicts of interests
associated with underwriting relationships.
3.1 General Hypotheses
General Trends. The regulations lowered the ability of investment banks to influence research
outputs of analysts. This was done by separating research from investment banking activities, ac-
companied by an increased threat of penalties. For these reasons we hypothesize that, as in Chen
and Marquez (2004), analysts in general are less likely to bias their recommendations upwards in the
Post-Reg period. In other words, for the same set of facts, an analyst will be less likely to exercise
optimism in the Post-Reg period, resulting in a less optimistic recommendation. We obtain
H1: Analysts’ optimism, as reflected in stock recommendations, will decline in the Post-Reg period
compared to the Pre-Reg period.
9We also examine a longer period starting in 1995 with no significant change in the results.
10Conflicts of interest can also influence analysts’ earnings forecasts, but in this case, the influence might occur in
more subtle ways, for example, through an outright optimistic forecast or through strategic pessimism in order to avoid
earnings disappointments. The literature on the subject presents mixed results, with some reporting an influence of
underwriting activies on analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Rajan and Servaes (1998), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003), and
Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2003)), but others do not (e.g., Lin and McNichols (1998) and Agrawal and Chen (2004)).
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The above prediction could result from two non-mutually exclusive explanations. First, a decline
in analysts’ optimism could lead to lower firm valuations because less optimistic assumptions (e.g.
more moderate growth forecasts) are used in valuation models. Lower valuations, in turn, lead to
more moderate recommendations and a shift in their cross-sectional distribution. A second story
that can explain a shift in stock recommendations after the regulations refers to a redefinition of
recommendation categories. That is, the same set of facts can be interpreted with the same degree of
optimism by analysts in both the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods, but the mapping of similar valuations
into a set of recommendations might be diﬀerent because of the redefinitions of ratings in the Post-
Reg period. Rule 472 states that “definitions of ratings terms also must be consistent with their
plain meaning”and that “a ‘hold’ rating should not mean or imply that an investor should sell a
security”(Rule 472, p. 9). In fact, a survey of buy-side professionals taken before the regulations
(Boni andWomack (2002a)) showed that 79% of respondents interpreted a “hold” recommendation as a
“sell” recommendation.11 If brokerage houses changed their behavior by agreeing with the regulations’
suggestion that they were issuing a “hold” when they meant a “sell”, a direct impact of the regulations
would be an increase in the fraction of pessimistic recommendations. Thus, in general, such redefinition
of recommendations would result in an observable change in optimism. Around the beginning of the
Post-Reg period, many brokers moved from a system of 5-tier recommendations to a system of 3-
tier recommendations. Along with this switch, we conjecture that the brokers also redefined their
recommendations to comply with the rules that were issued around that time.
Price Reactions. We argue that following the regulations, recommendations should entail diﬀerent
price reactions than in the period prior to the regulations. To get the intuition for this, it is convenient
to view recommendations as a discretization of an analyst’s overall estimates. Figure 1 depicts how
analysts’ bias aﬀects their recommendations. The figure considers a 3-tier discretization of the analyst’s
estimates. There are two cutoﬀ values c1 and c2. If the analyst’s overall estimates fall below c1 she
issues a “sell” recommendation. If her overall estimates are between c1 and c2, she issues a “hold”
recommendation, while if the estimates fall above c1 she issues a “buy” recommendation. As the
analyst becomes more optimistic, the cutoﬀ points c1 and c2 move to the left. So, for instance, firms
whose recommendation would have been a “hold” by an unbiased analyst will be reported as “buy”
by a biased one. The figure shows that a regulatory reform that lowers the optimism of the analyst
will increase the frequency of negative recommendations.
11Here is how the press viewed the issue in 2001: “In the language of Wall Street, where firms are loath to issue
sell recommendations, a neutral rating is tantamount to a sell,”and one brokerage house was already “encouraging its
analysts to call a stock a sell instead of hiding behind euphemisms such as neutral or market perform”(“Merrill Alters a
Policy on Analysts,”Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2001, p. C1).
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Interestingly, such a regulation increases the informativeness of “buy” recommendations but de-
creases the informativeness of “sell” recommendations. Indeed, when an analyst is highly optimistic
(as in the top of Figure 1), “buy” recommendations are issued for a large variety of firms, and hence
are not very informative. By contrast, “sell” recommendations are issued only for a small set of very
bad firms, and hence convey very negative information. When the analyst becomes less optimistic, as
in the lower parts of Figure 1, “buy” recommendations are restricted to a smaller and better subset
of firms, and hence become more informative. Thus, we would expect a stronger (more positive)
price response to such recommendations. On the other hand, “sell” recommendations now include
a larger set of firms, with relatively better prospects than the firms recommended “sell” by a more
optimistic analyst. Thus, the interpretation of a “sell” recommendation as signaling poor prospects
for a firm becomes weaker when the analyst becomes less optimistic, and the price response to such
recommendation is expected to be less negative.
H2a: The price response to “buy” recommendations in the Post-Reg period will be stronger (more
positive) than the price response in the Pre-Reg period.
H2b: The price response to “sell” recommendations in the Post-Reg period will be weaker (less nega-
tive) than the price response in the Pre-Reg period.
As for “hold” recommendations, Figure 1 shows that a regulatory reform that lowers the optimism
of analysts moves the set of firms for which a “hold” recommendation is issued to the right. This
improvement in the average quality of the firms recommended “hold” should be accompanied by better
market reactions than similar recommendations issued by a more optimistic analyst (or, less negative
market reactions, since it has been long known that “hold” used to convey negative information). If
the analyst is unbiased (bottom of Figure 1), a “hold” recommendation should convey no information
and therefore will not be followed by any price movement. We obtain
H2c: The price response to “hold” recommendations in the Post-Reg period will be less negative than
the price response in the Pre-Reg period.
3.2 Diﬀerential Bias Hypotheses
Past studies show that aﬃliated analysts are more optimistic about the future prospects of firms
underwritten by their employer than unaﬃliated analysts covering the same firms (e.g., Dugar and
Nathan (1995), Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998)). Two explanations are
provided for this empirical result. First, the “selection bias” explanation argues that firms are likely
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to choose underwriters whose analysts are more optimistic about their prospects (McNichols and
O’brien (1997)). This is “true” optimism that does not arise from strategic considerations by the
analysts. The “strategic bias” explanation argues that research departments issue more optimistic
forecasts and recommendations for strategic reasons to increase the likelihood of their firms being
hired as underwriters and/or to provide support for previously underwritten companies.
The motivation behind the regulations was to eliminate the dependence between the research and
investment banking departments. This is directly aimed at the “strategic bias” explanation for the
optimism in sell-side research. The dependence between research and investment banking departments
can arise in two ways. First, brokerage houses can express more optimism to reward firms for which
they also served as underwriters. Second, brokerage houses can be more optimistic about firms to
increase chances of gaining future underwriting business.
To capture the influence of the regulations on the first eﬀect, we test the following hypothesis
H3: When comparing the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods, there will be a decrease in the diﬀerential
optimism between aﬃliated analysts and unaﬃliated analysts, who possess diﬀerent degrees of
conflicts of interest linked to underwriting business.
Regarding the second eﬀect, we test the following hypothesis
H4: When comparing the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods, there will be a decrease in the diﬀerential
optimism reflected in stock recommendations issued for firms that raised equity compared to
firms that did not.
An alternative interpretation for analysts’ general optimism regarding equity-issuing firms is that
these firms time the oﬀering to align with periods in which analysts are optimistic about their future
prospects (see Baker and Wurgler, 2002). To the extent that the regulations did not aﬀect the market
timing behavior of managers, any diﬀerence between the periods is attributed to the conflicts of interest
explanation.
4 Data
Stock recommendations. We obtain information on stock recommendations from the IBES data-
base. We use recommendations that were issued in the Pre-Reg period (November 2000 - August
2002) and in the Post-Reg period (September 2002 - December 2004). For firms that issued equity,
we identify the recommendations issued during the two years following the equity oﬀering by analysts
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who are employed by either its lead underwriter(s) or by the co-managers (s) and label them as rec-
ommendations issued by ‘aﬃliated’ analysts. This definition is consistent with Bradley et al. (2005),
who argue that the interests of lead underwriters and co-managers are similar. The recommendations
issued by analysts that are not associated with the lead underwriter(s) or the co-manager(s) are la-
beled ‘unaﬃliated.’12 Some descriptive information about all stock recommendations available for our
analysis is provided in Panel A of Table 1.
Brokers. Our data covers all of the brokers issuing stock recommendations and surveyed by IBES. In
some of our analyses, we distinguish between the brokers that participated in the Global Settlement
and those who did not. We term the first group “big 10” and the second group “non-big 10.” See
Footnote 8 for a list of participants in the Global Settlement. Panel B of Table 1 reports some
descriptive statistics about the equity oﬀering market during our sample period, stratified by the
types of brokerage houses. The table reveals that the big 10 brokerage houses dominate the IPO and
the SEO market. They participated as lead or co-lead underwriters in 69% of the equity oﬀerings in
the Pre-Reg period. These oﬀerings accounted for about 87% of the total proceeds. In the Post-Reg
period, the participation of Big-10 brokerage houses slightly decreased.
Firms. Our analysis focuses on all US firms with available stock recommendations and long-term
growth forecasts in the IBES database. Some of our analyses require a definition of an underwriting
relationship between the analyst and the firm being recommended. To achieve that we focus on firms
that issued equity, either through an IPO or an SEO. To allow the inclusion of aﬃliated recommenda-
tions that were issued starting in November 2000, we include IPO’s and SEO’s starting from November
1998. We obtain a list of such firms from the SDC database. We exclude all closed-end funds and
trusts as well as all unit investment trusts. For each equity oﬀering, we identify the lead underwriter(s)
as well as the co-manager(s).
Some descriptive statistics about our sample firms are reported in Panel C of Table 1. We separate
the equity oﬀerings into three subperiods. The average proceeds for SEO’s in our sample ranges
between $170 and $270 million across our sample period. The average IPO proceeds range from $163
million and $348 million. The average market capitalization of an SEO firm is about $4 billion. IPO
firms are smaller, on average. Despite that, IPO firms exhibit lower book-to-market ratios, reflecting
their larger growth opportunities and their younger age.
12We acknowledge that there could be other proxies for the presence of conflicts of interest among analysts. For
example, Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2005) base their distinction on whether the analysts’ employer is a pure research
firm or a hybrid of research and investment banking firm.
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Stock returns. Some of our tests involve examining stock returns following analysts’ recommen-
dations. We obtain stock return information from CRSP. To analyze price reactions and long term
returns, we use size- and industry-adjusted returns. Size-adjusted returns for each stock are computed
by subtracting from the stock’s actual return the return of the CRSP market capitalization decile
portfolio corresponding to the stock. Given the prominence of industry benchmarks in the rating
systems, we also use industry-adjusted returns. Similar to the approach used by Womack (1996), we
compute industry-adjusted returns as follows. First, a size-adjusted return is computed for each stock
in the sample as well as for all other stocks from the NYSE and NASDAQ in the same industry, using
Fama and French’s (1997) 48-industries classification. The industry-adjusted return for each stock is
then computed as the diﬀerence between the size-adjusted return for the stock and the mean of the
size-adjusted returns for the industry-matched stocks.
5 Analysis of General Trends
In this section, we analyze the changes in the overall optimism expressed in analysts’ recommendations
following the regulations (hypotheses H1 and H2). We start by providing univariate and multivariate
tests of the change in optimism. Then we study the price reactions following recommendations.
5.1 Overall Optimism in Recommendations
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the distribution of recommendations in the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods using a 3-
tier rating system.13 In the Pre-Reg period, 60.7% of the recommendations were optimistic, while only
4.2% were pessimistic. The proportion of neutral recommendations in that period was 35.1%. The
distribution of recommendations becomes more balanced in the Post-Reg period. Then, the proportion
of optimistic recommendations dropped to 42.9%, the proportion of pessimistic recommendations
increased to 11.7%, and the proportion of neutral recommendations increased to 45.5%. These results
show a decline in optimism, and hence are consistent with H1.
Figures 2 and 3 shed additional light on time trends in analysts’ recommendations. The figures
describe the monthly distribution of consensus recommendations for the participants of the Global
Settlement and for other brokerage houses between January 1998 and December 2004.14 That is, for
13The diﬀerences in means of all variables across the periods are statistically significant.
14We extend the sample period for the purposes of the figure for illustrative purposes. We show that the trends existed
even before our sample period began. Some argue that the conflicts of interests were at their peak in the hot market
period of the 1990’s. To that extent, our analyses may understate the results in the Pre-Reg period. All our results hold
13
each month, we calculate the percentage of consensus recommendations in each rating category, and
report them in the figures. The figures diﬀer in the way that the consensus recommendations are
calculated. Figure 2 uses a 4-tier rating system, and Figure 3 uses a 3-tier system.15
Consider first the patterns of the distribution up to mid-2002 — that is, in the period before any
of the regulations had taken eﬀect. As we will discuss in the next section, during this period, the
vast majority of the brokerage houses were still using the expanded, four- or five-tier rating systems:
thus the 4-tier system used in Figure 2 can be deemed appropriate. The pattern of skewness towards
optimistic recommendations is striking. Pessimistic recommendations never reach more than 2% of
the sample before 2002. The bulk of consensus recommendations is concentrated in the “strong buy”
and “buy” categories, together accounting for 60% or more of the firms in the sample. Note the
pattern of an increasing fraction of “buy” recommendations, at the expense of a decreasing fraction
of “hold” recommendations, up to the year 2000. The period in which “buy” recommendations were
so prominent coincides with a hot market period for the underwriting business, and the decline in the
presence of “buy” recommendations coincides with the downturn both of the market conditions and of
underwriting business conditions. Along the cross-sectional dimension, the figures suggest that there
is not much diﬀerence in the distribution of consensus recommendations between the groups of big 10
and non-big 10 brokerage houses.
When we turn to the Post-Reg period, a diﬀerent pattern emerges. Now, of course, it is important
to take into consideration that many brokerage houses started using the reduced 3-tier system, so
inferences are made using both Figure 2 and Figure 3.
First, for big 10 brokerage houses, there is an overall increase in the fraction of firms rated pes-
simistic. The increase starts in early 2002, when one of the big 10 brokerage houses adopted a new
rating system, but really spikes in the second half of the year, most noticeably in September 2002, when
five of the brokerage houses adopted new systems. The fraction of firms in the pessimistic category
jumps from 3% to about 20%. This occurs at the expense of firms rated as “strong buy” and “buy”
(optimistic) categories. After November 2002, the distribution of the consensus recommendations for
big 10 brokerage houses presents similar fractions of firms in optimistic and pessimistic categories,
with more than 60% of the recommendations concentrated at the hold/neutral category.
Cross-sectional diﬀerences also emerge. Although we also observe a decrease (increase) in the
fraction of firms rated in the “strong buy” and “buy” (“hold” and “underperform”) categories for
if we extend our Pre-Reg sample to begin in January 1998.
15 In order to define the consensus recommendation for a firm in a certain month, we average its outstanding recom-
mendations for that month. Since ratings systems sometimes diﬀer between the pre- and post-regulation periods, we
adopt two forms of averaging, one based on the traditional five-tier I/B/E/S ranking and another based on a reduced
three-tier rating system. (Details on the averaging are shown in the Appendix.)
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non-big 10 brokerage houses, the fractions in the Post-Reg period are smaller than the ones presented
by the big 10 brokerage houses. Non-big 10 brokerage houses are now more upbeat than the big 10,
keeping more of the firms rated as optimistic.
5.1.2 New Rating Systems
One important aspect of the regulations is the stringent disclosure requirements imposed on how in-
formation is produced and disseminated by the brokerage houses. The new rules aimed at providing
investors with “better information to make assessments of a firm’s research” (SEC Release No. 45908,
p. 7), expressing concern about rating systems that were loosely defined and perhaps not properly
understood by the research’s clients. By analyzing the IBES dataset, articles in the media and infor-
mation from each brokerage house’s web-site, we collected information about general characteristics
of the rating system in use by each big 10 brokerage house, and whether a new rating system was
adopted after 2001.
The analysis indicates a widespread adoption of new rating systems, at least among the biggest
brokerage houses, along with the adoption of the new regulations. Eight out of the ten participants in
the Global Settlement adopted a new rating system in 2002, and 10 of the next 20 biggest brokerage
houses adopted a new rating system starting in 2002.16
Every new rating system adopted a 3-tier methodology, in contrast with the then traditional 5-tier
ratings. The motivation for this change can be linked to the disclosure requirements of the regulations
that “regardless of the rating system that a member employs, a member must disclose in each report the
percentage of all securities rated by the member which the member would assign a buy, hold/neutral
or sell rating” (Rule 2711, p. 7).
Given the widespread adoption of new rating systems, at least among the participants of the
Global Settlement, we investigate in more detail the new systems’ adoptions. We report in Table 3
some summary statistics about these events, for all the participants of the Global Settlement that
adopted new systems.
There is a concentrated adoption of new systems in September 2002 (five adoptions, four of them
on the same day), and only one such adoption occurred before July 2002 (the month when the new
NASD and NYSE regulations became eﬀective). The adoption date of most new rating systems
coincided with the introduction of the rule that brokerage houses have to disclose the distribution of
the outstanding recommendations together with each research report.17
16Beyond these 30 brokerage houses, we were able to identify only three other brokerage houses that changed their
ratings systems after 2001 and up to the end of 2003.
17One research professional quoted in a press article before this date voiced the expectation that analysts’ reluctance
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All brokerage houses reduced their coverage when they adopted the new rating system: the results
reported in the second and third columns of Table 3 indicate an average reduction of 12% in the size
of each brokerage house’s portfolios.18 The next set of columns reports how the new recommendations
are distributed among the three rating levels. All but the second brokerage house ended up with the
fraction of pessimistic recommendations around 20%; this is particularly remarkable given that all
these brokerage houses had, in the day before the new rating systems became eﬀective, less than 2%
of their covered firms rated at a pessimistic level.
We turn to analyze the previous classification of the new recommendations in each rating category.
First, the new distribution is not achieved by the addition of new firms to the portfolio of tracked
firms, as the fraction of initiations of coverage in each category never reaches more than 1% of the final
portfolio. Instead, new distributions were obtained by reshuﬄing — and, for the most part, downgrading
— outstanding recommendations. More than 90% of the newly rated pessimistic recommendations were
rated at least neutral under the old system, and more than 40% of the new neutral recommendations
were at least “buy” or “strong buy” under the old system. On the other hand, less than 5% of the new
optimistic recommendations were not already considered as such under the old rating system. These
results suggest that during the change in rating systems, brokers also redefined their recommendations
and shifted them downwards, creating a more balanced portfolio of recommendations over a short
period of time.
We also separately examined (but did not tabulate) the price reactions and long term returns to
recommendations issued during that change for the 8 brokers reported in Table 3. For the recommen-
dations classified in an optimistic category, 3-day returns are significantly positive in five out of eight
brokerage houses (for another brokerage house, the event returns are significantly negative), but the
eﬀect largely disappears after 6 months. For neutral and pessimistic recommendations, both event
reactions and long-term returns are typically insignificant. In other words, during the adoption of new
ratings systems, classifying a stock, even downgrading it towards a pessimistic rating, did not seem to
convey new information to the market.
Because the change in rating systems is a one-time event that has no information content, we
excluded from the remaining tests all recommendations associated with that event. In unreported
to issue pessimistic recommendations would be diminished once sell-side firms were forced to display their distribution
of rating. See “Should You Trust Wall Street’s New Ratings?” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2002, p. D1.
18 In unreported results, we analyze for each brokerage house the sample of firms whose coverage was discontinued
(dropped firms). Results suggest that the decision to drop a firm was related to size and past performance rather than
the firm’s future prospects. Thus, the tendency of analysts to drop firms with unfavorable prospects (e.g., McNichols
and O’Brien (1997)) is not revealed here, perhaps unsurprisingly given that the goal of adopting a new ratings system
was to achieve a more balanced distribution between optimistic and pessimistic recommendations, which required the
presence of firms with unfavorable prospects in the sample of firms with continued coverage.
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results, we did include these recommendations, and the conclusions of the study did not change.
5.1.3 Multivariate Tests
A more formal test of H1 can be achieved by quantifying the propensity of brokerage houses to
issue recommendations of diﬀerent types, over time and across brokerage houses. We examine this
propensity by a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 whenever
the recommendation is of a specific type (optimistic in one specification and pessimistic in another),
and the data points are new recommendations issued during the period under analysis.
We estimate cross-sectional time-series (fixed eﬀects) logistic regressions. Like the traditional panel
data regression, the fixed eﬀects logistic regression is equivalent to having one intercept for each firm.
This allows controlling for possible firm characteristics that are robustly linked to the likelihood of
receiving recommendations of certain types - e.g., institutional ownership; see Ljungqvist et al. (2004).
We estimate the following model:
Pr(REC = type) = α1BIG10× PRE + α2PASTMKTPERF × PRE
+α3PASTFIRMPERF × PRE + α4POST (1)
+α5BIG10× POST + α6PASTMKTPERF × POST
+α7PASTFIRMPERF × POST + ε,
where
REC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is of a certain type (optimistic or
pessimistic) using a 3-tier system.
BIG10 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation was issued by one of the partici-
pants of the Global Settlement.
PRE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation was issued in the Pre-Reg period.
POST is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation was issued in the Post-Reg period.
PASTFIRMPERF is the size- and industry-adjusted cumulative stock return of the recom-
mended firm during the 6 months prior to the recommendation.
PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return 6 months prior to the recommendation.
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We included PASTFIRMPER and PASTMKTPERF given the overwhelming evidence that
momentum is an important determinant of new recommendations (see Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh
et al. (2004)). To quantify the diﬀerential likelihood of big 10 brokerage houses issuing optimistic or
pessimistic recommendations, we included the BIG10 dummy. Finally, the controls were interacted
with PRE and POST dummies for whether the recommendation was issued before or after September
2002. In particular, examining the POST coeﬃcient allows us to formally test hypothesis H1. Results
are presented in Table 4.19
Model I of Table 4 estimates the likelihood of having a pessimistic recommendation. The strongest
determinant of the likelihood is the POST dummy; its odds ratio of 4.31 indicates an increase of 331%
in the odds of a new recommendation being pessimistic if it is issued after September 2002. In addi-
tion, the momentum eﬀect is robust. The coeﬃcients on momentum at the firm level are significantly
negative in both the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods, suggesting that a pessimistic (optimistic) recom-
mendation is more likely to be issued following poor (good) stock price performance. The coeﬃcients
on market returns is negative and significant in the Pre-Reg period, and positive but insignificant in
the Post-Reg period.
Regarding how the type of brokerage house is linked to this likelihood, the coeﬃcient of BIG10×
PRE is significantly negative (at the 1% level). Its odds ratio of 0.74 indicates that a recommendation
from a big 10 firm issued before September 2002 decreases the odds of it being pessimistic by 26%. On
the other hand, the big 10 brokerage houses’ propensity to issue more pessimistic recommendations
after September 2002 is captured by the significantly positive (at the 1% level) coeﬃcient BIG10 ×
POST : Its odds ratio of 1.56 indicates that the incremental eﬀect — after accounting for the fact that
the observation is post-September 2002 — of coming from a big 10 brokerage increases the odds of its
being pessimistic by 56%.
Model II reports the results of a similar analysis done by modeling the likelihood of the recom-
mendation being optimistic. The results of Model II corroborate the overall patterns seen so far that
there were fewer optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period (in this case, the POST coeﬃ-
cient is significantly negative). They both provide support for hypothesis H1 of a decline in analysts’
optimism in the period after the regulations were adopted. Moreover, the significant coeﬃcient on the
interaction term, BIG10×POST , indicates that the Global Settlement component of the regulations
is attributed with an additional eﬀect.
19Our analysis includes all the recommendations in the relevant periods except for the recommendations associated
with the change in ratings system. In unreported regressions we included recommendations in a month for a given firm
only if this firm had recommendations issued by both a big 10 and a non-big 10 brokerage house in that month. This is
intended to control for diﬀerences in the characteristics of firms for which big 10 and non-big 10 brokerage houses issued
recommendations. The results are similar.
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5.2 Price Reactions and Returns Following Recommendations
In this section, we analyze the relevance of recommendations — i.e., whether recommendations convey
useful information. Following previous literature (e.g., Barber et al. (2001), Green (2004), Jegadeesh
et al. (2004)), we focus on price reactions to newly issued recommendations because they are more
likely to indicate investors’ perceptions regarding the value of the recommendation. We analyze price
reactions based on size- and industry-adjusted measures of abnormal returns. Our goal here is to test
H2a, H2b and H2c.
We examine two return windows. First we study short-term price reactions measured by the
three-day return centered around the recommendation announcement date. Second, we study six-
month long-term returns, starting at either one day prior to or two days following the announcement
date. This allows us to make inferences about the investors’ reaction and the overall value of the
recommendations. In all our return analyses, we exclude recommendations issued during the change
in rating systems.20
Recall that H2a, H2b, and H2c suggest that following the adoption of the regulations, the price
response to optimistic recommendations will be more positive, whereas the price responses to the
neutral and pessimistic recommendations will be less negative. This applies to short and long term
returns.
To test the hypotheses, we first estimate the following model
RET = α1OPT + α2NEU + α3PESS + ε, (2)
where RET is the relevant stock return, and OPT, NEU, and PESS are dummy variables for op-
timistic, neutral, and pessimistic recommendations. We also estimate a more detailed model, taking
into account upgrades, downgrades and reiterations as follows:
RET = α1UP_OPT + α2RE_OPT + α3UP_NEU + α4DOWN_NEU + α5PESS + ε, (3)
where UP_OPT (UP_NEU) are initiations of coverage with optimistic (neutral) recommendations
or upgrades to optimistic (neutral) recommendations, RE_OPT includes reiterations of optimistic
recommendations, DOWN_NEU includes downgrades to neutral and PESS includes all pessimistic
recommendations.21
20For the big 10 firms, these are the changes reported in Table 3. We also obtained the date of change in rating systems
for smaller brokers, and treated them similarly. In unreported results, we repeated our return analysis without excluding
these recommendations. The main results are not changed.
21We do not examine reiterations of neutral and include all pessimistic recommendations under one category because
each of these sub-categories contains very few observations.
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Results are reported in Table 5.22 Panel A shows that the three-day price reaction to optimistic
recommendations in the Post-Reg period is about 80% greater than it was in the Pre-Reg period (2.18%
vs. 1.22%). Panel B shows that this result is mostly due to upgrades and initiations. The three-day
price reactions to neutral and pessimistic recommendations (Panel A) are significantly less negative
than in the previous period. For neutral recommendations, the price reaction is 60% less negative,
whereas for pessimistic recommendations, the price reaction is 45% less negative. In particular, Panel
B reveals a significant change regarding neutral recommendations. While in the Pre-Reg period,
investors reacted negatively to both upgrades and downgrades to neutral, in the Post-Reg event,
reactions to neutral are negative only for downgrades.
We now examine the returns following the initial investors’ reaction to the recommendations, i.e.
along the window of [+2,+122]. For the optimistic recommendations, the negative return of -1.48%
is significantly more negative than in the Pre-Reg period, and it represents a partial reversal of the
initial three-day reaction. There is no diﬀerence in post-event reactions to neutral and pessimistic
recommendations between the two periods.
Finally, we check the overall informativeness of recommendations by looking at the their long-term
returns, i.e. returns including both the event and the post-event periods. Thus, we examine the return
window of [-1,+122]. For optimistic recommendations, we find that returns in the Post-Reg period are
still significantly positive, but not significantly diﬀerent from the returns in the Pre-Reg period (Panel
A). For neutral and pessimistic recommendations, the long-term returns in the Post-Reg period are
significantly less negative than the corresponding ones in the Pre-Reg period.
Recall that the results in Figures 2 and 3 and in Table 4 indicate that the big 10 brokerage houses
were much more aggressive in reducing (increasing) the use of optimistic (pessimistic) recommenda-
tions. The empirical predictions of diﬀerent price reactions to the new distribution of recommendations
would thus apply more forcefully to these brokerage houses. Accordingly, we repeat the examination
in Table 5 constrained to the sample of big 10 recommendations. The results (unreported, available
upon request) support this view. They are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 5 but more
significant. In addition, both short- and long-term returns following optimistic recommendations are
more positive in the Post-Reg period. Also, long-term returns following upgrades to neutral are not
significantly diﬀerent from zero — i.e. the meaning of the “hold”/“neutral” rating seems to conform
22 In unreported results, we also use long-term return windows of 1, 3, and 9 months with no diﬀerence in results.
Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2005) report that a big fraction (in their sample, 20%) of recommendations are issued around
earnings announcements. To avoid the possibility that reactions to earnings announcements are driving the empirical
results here, we repeat the sampling procedure after removing recommendations issued around earnings announcement
dates: the results reported here are robust to this alternative sampling. Results are also robust to the removal of
recommendations issued during quiet periods.
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to its naming in the Post-Reg period.
In sum, these results support Hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c. This is true for all recommenda-
tions for short term price reactions. For long term returns, results hold for neutral and pessimistic
recommendations (and also for optimistic recommendations, in the case of big 10 brokerage houses).
Our interpretation of these results is that investors are responding to the regulations and any changes
in analysts’ behavior that followed. In fact, the investors’ short-term reaction to optimistic recom-
mendations in the Post-Reg period may have been too strong because it is partially reversed in the
subsequent months.
6 Conflicts of Interests Related to Equity Oﬀerings
In this section, we investigate hypotheses H3 and H4, which makes predictions regarding the diﬀerential
optimism that might result from conflicts of interest linked to underwriting business. We proxy for
such conflicts by the presence of an underwriting relationship. Following previous literature (e.g., Lin
and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999)), we define the underwriting relationship, for
each newly issued recommendation, based on whether the brokerage house participated in an equity
oﬀering of the firm being recommended prior to the issuance of the recommendation. We define a
brokerage house as aﬃliated with the firm if the brokerage house was a lead underwriter or a co-
manager in an IPO or SEO for that firm during the 24-month period prior to the issuance of the new
recommendation.23
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
This analysis focuses on the set of firms that went through an equity oﬀering (IPO or SEO) and on
their recommendations in the 24 months following an equity oﬀering. Table 6 reports the frequency of
stock recommendations in the two periods for the sample used in this analysis. Panels A and B break
the sample by aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts. In the Pre-Reg period, 70% of aﬃliated analysts’
recommendations were optimistic. In the Post-Reg period, the percentage of optimistic recommenda-
tions by aﬃliated analysts declined to 49%. “Hold” recommendations by aﬃliated analysts account for
28% in the Pre-Reg period as opposed to 44% in the Post-Reg period. The percentage of pessimistic
recommendations by aﬃliated analysts in the Pre-Reg period was 2%, and it grew to 6.5% in the
23 In untabulated tests, we also define aﬃliation based on shorter windows of 6 and 12 months. In addition, we also
used an alternative forward-looking definition based on the existence of an equity oﬀering in the six months before and
after the recommendation. The results are not sensitive to these alternative definitions.
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Post-Reg period. These numbers show that aﬃliated analysts have drastically changed the mix of
their recommendations in the Post-Reg period.
The changes for unaﬃliated analysts are similar but less dramatic in magnitude. For example, the
percentage of “buy” recommendations fell from 64% in the Pre-Reg period to 48% in the Post-Reg
period. The percentage of “hold” recommendations increased from 33% in the Pre-Reg period to 43%
in the Post-Reg period.
Panels C and D break the sample by IPOs and SEOs and draw a similar picture. There is a decline
in optimistic recommendations for both IPOs and SEOs in the Post-Reg period and a steep increase
in pessimistic recommendations.
It is interesting to compare these results with the results in Table 2, which relate to all analyst
recommendations, and not just to those that follow an equity oﬀering. Notably, both aﬃliated and
unaﬃliated analysts tend to issue more optimistic recommendations following equity oﬀerings. The
change in the distribution of recommendations following the regulations is more dramatic for the
subsample of equity oﬀerings.
To conduct a more formal analysis of the change in recommendation practices, Table 7 reports some
statistics on the distribution of recommendations. An observation in this table is a firm that underwent
an IPO or an SEO. We aggregate the recommendations issued in a window of 24 months following
the stock issuance. We collect separately the recommendations issued by aﬃliated and unaﬃliated
analysts and calculate the mean recommendation in each group. We exclude from the sample firms
that did not have at least one aﬃliated analyst and one unaﬃliated analyst during the 24-month
period.24 The numbers reported in the tables are the mean of the means, the median of the means,
and standard deviation of the means. The levels of recommendations are assigned a numeric value as
follows: optimistic (“buy” or “strong buy”)=2, neutral (“hold”)=3 and pessimistic (“underperform”
and “sell”)=4.
The mean recommendation in the Pre-Reg period for aﬃliated analysts is 2.28, compared to 2.46
for unaﬃliated analysts. In the Post-Reg period, the mean recommendation for aﬃliated analysts
increased to 2.60, as compared to 2.48 for unaﬃliated analysts. The diﬀerence between the mean
recommendations of aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts is significant in the Pre-Reg period (t-stat
of 12.13) and significant in the opposite direction in the Post-Reg period (t-stat of -7.41). That is,
there is some evidence that in the Post-Reg period, aﬃliated analysts expressed lower optimism when
compared to unaﬃliated analysts.
24Our results are not sensitive to the length of the recommendations window. We obtained similar results for windows
of 3, 6 and 12 months following the equity issuance.
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To further examine whether the diﬀerential optimism between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts
has changed between the two periods, we define the DIFF statistic as follows. For each sample point
(an IPO or an SEO), we calculate the mean aﬃliated recommendation and the mean unaﬃliated
recommendation. DIFF is then defined as the diﬀerence between the two, deflated by the average
recommendation during the relevant period (Pre-Reg or Post-Reg). Note that DIFF is typically
negative because aﬃliated analysts are expected to issue more optimistic recommendations. Thus,
a larger (less negative) DIFF in a period means that the wedge between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated
analysts in that period is smaller.
Table 7 reports the average DIFF for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. In the Pre-Reg period,
DIFF is significantly negative (t-stat of -13.73), whereas in the Post-Reg period, DIFF is significantly
positive (t-stat of 8.21). Table 7 also reports the results of a t-test comparing DIFF across the two
periods. The results show that DIFF is significantly less negative in the Post-Reg period compared
to the Pre-Reg period, indicating that the diﬀerential bias has indeed declined.25 Again, the evidence
suggests that aﬃliated analysts are issuing more pessimistic forecasts in the Post-Reg period.
The results for the Pre-Reg period are consistent with the findings of Dugar and Nathan (1995),
Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003),
showing a diﬀerential bias by aﬃliated analysts. Consistent with H3, the results for the Post-Reg
period suggest that the regulations decreased this diﬀerential bias. Our results suggest that this
diﬀerential bias may have even flipped directions. However, we do not emphasize the direction flip
because in the multivariate tests that follow, this result disappears.
6.2 Multivariate Analysis
6.2.1 Cross-sectional analysis
Next, we provide a multivariate test for H3 and H4. In this test, we look at individual recommendations
rather than focusing just on aggregate recommendations. We estimate an expansion of the panel data
25As we see from table 1, the types of firms going through IPO/SEOs have changed over time. To distinguish between
changes resulting from regulations versus simply a change in the types of firms in the sample, we conducted a robustness
check for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. In this test, we matched firms with similar market capitalization and
book-to-market ratio and compared the diﬀerential bias of aﬃlated versus unaﬃliated analysts for these matched pairs.
The results show a significant decrease in the aﬃliated analysts’ recommendation bias in the Post-Reg period and are
consistent with the main results.
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logistic model (1) examined in Section 5.1.3:
Pr(REC = type) = α1AFF × PRE + α2SEOIPO × PRE + α3BIG10× PRE
+α4PASTFIRMPERF × PRE + α5PASTMKTPERF × PRE
+α6POST + α7AFF × POST + α8SEOIPO × POST + α9BIG10× POST (4)
+α10PASTFIRMPERF × POST + α11PASTMKTPERF × POST + ε
The new variables in this model are AFF and SEOIPO. AFF is an indicator variable equal to
1 if the recommendation was issued by an aﬃliated broker, and SEOIPO is an indicator equal to 1
whenever the recommendation was issued for a firm that underwent IPO/SEO during the previous
24-month period. Notice, thus, that the model allows the inclusion of all the recommendations, not
only the ones issued for IPO/SEO firms. The incremental eﬀect on the level of optimism of a new
recommendation being issued for a firm that had recently undergone IPO/SEO will be captured by
the SEOIPO coeﬃcients, and the diﬀerential optimism of aﬃliated vs. unaﬃliated analysts will be
reflected in the AFF coeﬃcients. The other variables are as in Section 5.1.3. As before, the models
also include firm fixed-eﬀects to control for firm characteristics.
Table 8 presents the results of diﬀerent specifications of this basic model. Models (1), (2), (4),
and (5) include only firms that have undergone an IPO/SEO, while models (3) and (6) include all
firms and allow a comparison between IPO/SEO firms and non-IPO/SEO firms. Focusing first on the
results of models (3) and (6), using all observations including those of firms that did not undergo an
IPO/SEO, we observe the same eﬀects of the POST and BIG10 dummies and of the performance
variables as in Table 4. For example, the coeﬃcient on POST is significantly negative in model (3)
and significantly positive in model (6). This reiterates that analysts in general are less likely to issue
positive recommendations and more likely to issue negative recommendations in the Post-Reg period.
Our main interest in these models is in the proxies for the presence of conflicts of interest, i.e.
the AFF and SEOIPO dummies. First, the coeﬃcients of AFF × PRE and SEOIPO × PRE
are significantly negative in the pessimistic model and significantly positive in the optimistic model.
This suggests the presence of two layers of excess optimism during the Pre-Reg period. First, the
SEOIPO × PRE coeﬃcient suggests that analysts were more optimistic (i.e. more likely to issue an
optimistic recommendation and less likely to issue a pessimistic recommendation) with respect to firms
that had undergone an IPO/SEO, independent of whether an analyst was aﬃliated or not. Beyond this
overall optimism toward IPO/SEO firms, the AFF eﬀect reflects the incremental optimism of aﬃliated
analysts vis a vis unaﬃliated analysts. We can quantify these eﬀects based on the coeﬃcients’ odds
ratios. In the optimistic formulation, the odds ratio of 1.40 for the SEOIPO×PRE dummy reflects
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an increase in 40% in the odds of a recommendation being optimistic when it is issued for a firm with
a recent IPO/SEO oﬀering; besides, if that recommendation comes from an aﬃliated analyst, there is
an additional increase of 12% in the odds of optimism.26
The AFF×PRE eﬀect is consistent with the claim that aﬃliated analysts were more optimistic in
the Pre-Reg period, a concern that was very often raised during the discussion of the new regulations.
For example, most of the evidence on conflicts of interest, expressed in the e-mails that initiated the
investigations that led to the Global Settlement and documented in the Letters of AWC for their
participants, were based on analysts being overly optimistic for firms whose equity oﬀering they had
managed. The results on SEOIPO×PRE reveal that an analyst was in general more optimistic for
a firm that had recently undergone IPO/SEO, even if the analyst had not directly participated in the
equity oﬀering.
Moving to the Post-Reg period in the optimistic model (5), we observe that the excess optimism
expressed by aﬃliated analysts disappears as the interaction term, AFF ×POST , is no longer signif-
icant, and the hypothesis that AFF × PRE is equal to AFF × POST is rejected at the 5% level.27
This provides for a direct examination of H3, i.e., the wedge or diﬀerential bias between aﬃliated
and unaﬃliated analysts indeed has decreased in the Post-Reg period.28 When all observations are
included in model (6), we find that the excess optimism towards SEO/IPO firms disappeared in the
Post-Reg period. The coeﬃcient on SEOIPO×POST is no longer significant, providing support for
H4. The reduction in the significance level for the test examining whether AFF × PRE is equal to
AFF × POST is likely due to inclusion of non-IPO/SEO firms, for which all recommendations are
considered unaﬃliated, thus providing no variation in the variable AFF . This is likely to reduce the
power of significance tests for the AFF variable.
The pessimistic model tells a diﬀerent story. In model (3), the AFF × POST and SEOIPO ×
POST coeﬃcients are significantly negative, that is, analysts are still less likely to issue pessimistic
recommendations in the Post-Reg period. We also cannot reject the hypothesis that AFF ×PRE and
AFF × POST are equal in both models (2) and (3).
The results also suggest a major diﬀerence between the firms that participated in the Global
26Notice that the odds ratio eﬀects are multiplicative; hence the overall increase in the odds of a recommendation
being optimistic for aﬃliated analysts is 56%, i.e. 1.40× 1.12 = 1.56.
27These results are slightly sensitive to the definition of aﬃliation. When we define aﬃliation based only on the lead
underwriter, there is still a propensity of aﬃliated analysts to issue more optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg
period. The rest of the results in Table 8 are not sensitive to the definition of aﬃliation.
28Notice the need to control for brokerage house attributes. The AFF × POST coeﬃcient is significantly negative in
model (4), but this happens because the model does not include the BIG10 dummy. That is, one can erroneously infer
that aﬃliated analysts were significantly less likely to issue optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period if she
does not control for the decrease in optimism expressed by the participants of the Global Settlement in this period.
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Settlement and those that did not. Examining models (5) and (6) we see that prior to the regulation
the big 10 brokerage houses were as likely to issue optimistic recommendations as other brokerage
houses. In contrast, after the regulation, the odds of a big 10 brokerage house issuing an optimistic
recommendation are significantly lower as reflected by the coeﬃcient of the BIG10× POST.
With respect to pessimistic recommendation we observe a reversal in the behavior of big 10 bro-
kerage houses. Prior to the regulation these brokerage houses were significantly less likely to issue
pessimistic recommendations (BIG10× PRE is significantly negative in models (2) and (3)). In the
Post-Reg period, big 10 brokerage houses are significantly more likely to issue pessimistic recommen-
dations (BIG10× PRE is significantly positive in models (2) and (3)).
Overall, the panel data results suggest that analysts changed their behavior in the period when the
regulations are in place, but they changed it in an asymmetric way. When deciding whether to post an
optimistic recommendation, aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts, and even analysts issuing recommen-
dations for non-IPO/SEO firms, now behave similarly. On the other hand, when deciding whether to
post a pessimistic recommendation, these three types of analysts still behave very diﬀerently: analysts
in general are less pessimistic towards IPO/SEO firms, and among analysts posting recommendations
for firms with recent underwriting business, aﬃliated analysts are less pessimistic than unaﬃliated
ones. These changes are even more pronounced among those brokerage houses that participated in
the Global Settlement.
6.2.2 Time-series analysis
A potential concern is that some exogenous macroeconomic factors like stock market behavior and
GDP growth influence the decline in diﬀerential optimism by aﬃliated analysts. For instance, it
may be that in a period of high stock returns and fast economic growth, aﬃliated analysts tend to
be extremely optimistic, or that in periods of extremely low stock returns and low economic growth,
aﬃliated analysts feel a strong need to support the stocks that their investment bank issued. To address
these concerns, we create a monthly version of DIFF. Namely, for each month we calculate DIFFM
as the diﬀerence between recommendations of aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts issued during the
month for IPOs and SEOs that took place in the previous 24 months. We then estimate the following
model:
DIFFM = α+ β1PASTMKTPERF + β2GDP + β3PROCEEDS + β4POST + ε. (5)
PASTMKTPERF , as defined before, is a proxy for the performance of the stock market. We then
include proxies for the overall economic conditions (GDP is the annualized growth in GDP in that
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month) and for the conditions of the underwriting market (PROCEEDS is the logarithm of the total
dollar raised in IPO’s or SEO’s in previous month). As before, POST is a dummy variable equal to 1
for months belonging to the Post-Reg period. Table 9 reports results of diﬀerent specifications of this
model.
Notice first that when all variables are included, the coeﬃcients on GDP growth and on the
underwriting market conditions are significantly negative, suggesting that good economic conditions
and hot markets tend to increase the wedge between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts. H3 suggests
that we observe a positive and significant coeﬃcient β4. In fact, all specifications show a significantly
positive β4 (at the 1% level for two specifications, and at the 5% level for two other specifications —
all with Newey-West standard errors). This reinforces the view oﬀered by H3 that the regulations led
to the reduction of the diﬀerential bias between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts.
In summary, we conclude that following the adoption of the regulations, there is a reduction
in the diﬀerential optimism of aﬃliated analysts. Our analyses suggest that aﬃliated analysts no
longer issue optimistically-biased recommendations for firms that used the analyst’s employer as a
lead underwriter or as a co-manager in their IPO or SEO, and that the overall optimism towards
IPO/SEO firms was also eliminated. Diﬀerences still persist among analysts, though, with respect to
pessimistic recommendations.
6.3 Price Reactions and Returns Following Recommendations
In our final analysis, we ask whether and to what extent the market recognizes the excess optimism
linked to the presence of underwriting relationships and whether its recognition diﬀers across periods.
To accomplish that, we examine price reactions to three types of recommendations: (1) recommenda-
tions issued for firms that did not undergo an IPO/SEO in the previous 24 months (non-IPO/SEO
recommendations); (2) recommendations issued by aﬃliated analysts for firms that have undergone
an IPO/SEO in the previous 24 months (aﬃliated recommendations); and (3) recommendations is-
sued by unaﬃliated analysts for firms that have undergone an IPO/SEO in the previous 24 months
(unaﬃliated recommendations).
If the market believes that conflicts of interest are driving the optimism in recommendations coming
from aﬃliated analysts, it should discount the usefulness of the signal provided by their recommen-
dations. We test how the market reacts to the excess optimism by examining the event (three-day)
reactions to aﬃliated, unaﬃliated and non-IPO/SEO recommendations. Further, we examine longer
term returns to evaluate whether the market fully adjusts for the excess optimism. If so, there will be
no diﬀerence in subsequent performance of recommendations coming from diﬀerent analysts.
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For these tests, we estimate a regression similar to equation (3), but in this case, we interact each
recommendation classification with the dummies for the recommendation origin (aﬃliated, unaﬃliated
or non-IPO/SEO recommendation). The regressions are estimated separately for the Pre-Reg and
Post-Reg periods, and with the dependent variable RET being either the event (3-day) or long-term
(6-month ahead) size and industry-adjusted returns. The results are presented in Table 10.
6.3.1 The Pre-Reg period
We focus first on results for reactions to recommendations in the Pre-Reg period. Recall from Table
8 that there was an excess optimism for recommendations issued for firms that underwent an IPO or
an SEO, and, among those recommendations, an additional excess optimism for those coming from
aﬃliated analysts. Therefore, the question is whether and to what extent these layers of optimism
were recognized by market participants.
Event reactions reported in Panel A suggest that recommendations issued for IPO/SEO firms were
significantly discounted by investors in the Pre-Reg period. For example, the average market reaction
to optimistic recommendations issued for non-IPO/SEO firms was +1.25%, which was economically
and statistically bigger than the reactions to recommendations issued for IPO/SEO recommendations
(either aﬃliated or unaﬃliated). The same pattern of larger (i.e. less negative) market reactions to
non-IPO/SEO recommendations applies to neutral and pessimistic recommendations as well.
Among the recommendations issued for IPO/SEO firms, the excess optimism of aﬃliated analysts is
only partially reflected in the event reactions: investors discounted aﬃliated neutral recommendations
but not aﬃliated optimistic and pessimistic recommendations. Therefore, prior to the regulations,
the market acted as if at least part of the optimism expressed towards IPO/SEO firms in general was
not warranted. However, the market did not seem to react diﬀerently to aﬃliated recommendations
compared to unaﬃliated recommendations (except for neutral recommendations).
However, Panel B shows that in the Pre-Reg period, the market has not fully adjusted for the
excess optimism. Post-event returns to recommendations issued by aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts
are all significantly negative. That is, investors discounted recommendations issued to IPO/SEO firms
at event time, but they should have discounted them even more. There is not much diﬀerence in post-
event returns between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated recommendations, with the exception of a significantly
larger post-event underperformance of optimistic recommendations coming from unaﬃliated analysts.
In unreported results, we find that this result is sensitive to the definition of aﬃliated analysts and
disappears if the aﬃliation is defined based only on the lead underwriter. An underreaction is also
observed for recommendations issued to non-IPO/SEO firms, as their post-event returns are still
28
significantly positive.
6.3.2 The Post-Reg period
We now examine price reactions to recommendations in the Post-Reg period. In contrast with the Pre-
Reg period, the market no longer discounts optimistic recommendations of IPO/SEO firms relative to
non-IPO/SEO firms. The reactions to neutral and pessimistic recommendations issued for IPO/SEO
firms are still significantly more negative, suggesting that the market seems to take into account that
recommendations issued for IPO/SEO firms are still less likely to be pessimistic. More importantly,
unlike the Pre-Reg period, during the Post-Reg period, there is no diﬀerence in post-event returns
among aﬃliated, unaﬃliated, and non-IPO/SEO recommendations, suggesting that investors have
been adjusting at event time for any bias that might still exist in recommendations.
Since there is no evidence of excess optimism coming from underwriting business in this period,
one should not expect diﬀerential price reactions to underwriter recommendations. Consistent with
this view, and in contrast to the Pre-Reg period, event reactions to optimistic recommendations
do not diﬀer between aﬃliated and non-IPO/SEO recommendations. Among IPO/SEO firms, we
notice no diﬀerence between the reactions to aﬃliated and unaﬃliated optimistic and pessimistic
recommendations. Aﬃliated recommendations are still accompanied by larger negative reactions to
neutral recommendations compared to unaﬃliated analysts (-3.01% vs. -1.76%). This is consistent
with the results in Table 8, showing that aﬃliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic
recommendations in the Post-Reg period.29
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of regulations on sell-side analysts’ research. The regulations
— Rule NASD 2711, Rule NASD 472, and the Global Settlement — were aimed at curbing the conflicts
of interest between investment banking and research departments. Using stock recommendations as
a proxy for sell-side research output, we investigate whether and how sell-side research changed in
response to the regulations, and how investors reacted. Our main proxy for conflicts of interest is the
presence of an underwriting relationship between the brokerage house and the firm being recommended.
For this, we look at aﬃliated analysts, those working for brokerage houses that had participated as
lead underwriters or co-managers in a recent equity oﬀering of that firm. We also use firms that had
29Notice, though, that there is no direct prediction regarding whether aﬃliated analysts changed their behavior re-
garding neutral recommendations; the logistic regressions in Table 8 do not examine directly the likelihood of issuing
neutral recommendations.
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undergone an IPO or SEO as proxies for the presence of conflicts of interest.
We show that conflicts of interest were an important determinant of stock recommendations prior
to the regulations. Analysts were significantly more (less) likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic)
recommendations for firms that had undergone a recent IPO or SEO. Among recommendations issued
for such firms, analysts that had been lead underwriters or co-managers of the IPO/SEO were even
more (less) likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations. Moreover, we find that investors
did not adjust fully for this bias. This corroborates other studies’ findings. For example, Boni and
Womack (2002b, 2003) suggest that institutional investors “are able to de-bias the brokerage research
they receive,” while more naïve retail investors, “who lack the awareness or education necessary to
adequately filter the recommendations,” are left disenfranchised. Along this line, anecdotal evidence
around 2001 indicated that individual investors “unaware of Wall Street semantics often take ratings
at their face value” (“Merrill Alters a Policy on Analysts,” Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2001, p.
C1). Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2004) confirm these concerns by showing empirically that retail
investors indeed used to take analysts’ stock recommendations at face value and failed to adjust for
their biases. Collectively, our results and these findings shed some light on the motivations behind the
regulatory initiative.
Did the regulations achieve their objectives? We conclude that the regulations were at least
partially successful in curbing the influence of the conflicts of interest over analysts’ stock recommen-
dations. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of receiving an optimistic recommendation no longer depends
on whether the firm had gone IPO/SEO or whether the brokerage house had participated in any such
IPO/SEO. However, even after the regulations were adopted, analysts have been reluctant to issue
pessimistic recommendations for IPO/SEO firms, and aﬃliated analysts are even more reluctant to
be pessimistic about these stocks.
We also report other diﬀerences in the way recommendations are issued under the new regulatory
regime. We find a significant shift in the overall distribution of stock recommendations, from a
distribution skewed towards optimistic recommendations to a more balanced one. The change is even
more dramatic for the “big 10” brokerage houses that participated in the Global Settlement. This shift
may be partly due to a change in optimism originating from a reclassification of the recommendations’
categories, whereby analysts shifted their interpretation of the ratings and reduced what was considered
a misuse of some of the ratings categories. For example, market reactions indicate that the aggregation
of stocks with negative prospects under the “hold” rating was prevalent before the new regulations,
but it no longer occurs, especially for the big 10 brokerage houses. The shift could also be due to a
reduction in use of optimistic assumptions in valuation models, resulting in more modest firm values
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and, as a result, less optimistic recommendations.
We expect changes in optimism due to reclassifications of recommendations to be universal, i.e.
these changes will be eﬀective for both aﬃliated and unaﬃliated analysts as well as for analysts issuing
recommendations to non-IPO/SEO firms. To the extent that our expectations are correct, the change
in the behavior of aﬃliated analysts vis a vis unaﬃliated analysts, and in general of analysts issuing
recommendations for IPO/SEO firms vis a vis non-IPO/SEO firms, indicates that at least some of
the change in optimism reflects analysts’ reluctance to add an optimistic view to the assumptions
underlying their valuation models.
Our results shed light on prior literature regarding analysts’ optimism and underwriting rela-
tionships. One explanation for aﬃliated analysts’ optimism is a strategic bias originating from the
analysts’ conflicts of interest. The second explanation for the observed optimistic bias refers to the
selection mechanism: firms choose their underwriters based on analysts’ opinions, and naturally, a firm
is more likely to choose analysts who are already optimistic about the firm’s prospects. Given that
the regulations’ foremost motivation was to curb conflicts of interest and that there is no apparent
reason for them to influence the mechanism by which firms select their underwriters, the reduction
in observed optimism following the regulations is consistent with the first explanation for the bias.
On the other hand, analysts’ reluctance to issue pessimistic recommendations after the regulations is
consistent with the second explanation. That is, a firm is still likely to avoid analysts who are truly
pessimistic about its future prospects.
In summary, following the adoption of the new regulations, we observe two changes that are
consistent with the regulations’ objectives. First, there has been a significant reduction in excess
optimism resulting from conflicts of interest between research and investment banking departments.
Second, we observe a more meaningful use of rating levels by analysts. Both changes may provide a
more leveled playing field between retail and institutional investors.
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Appendix
To define the consensus recommendation for a firm in a certain month, some form of averaging of
outstanding recommendations among diﬀerent brokerage houses must be adopted. Here, the issue of
changing ratings systems has to be taken into consideration. The question is how to compare the
distribution of recommendations if the types of recommendations that are issued diﬀer, both over
time for each brokerage house that trimmed its rating levels when it adopted a new system, and across
brokerage houses, since not all of them trimmed their rating levels.
We analyze two approaches that can be used to define the inputs to the computation of the
consensus. One relies on the I/B/E/S mapping of each brokerage house’s classification into the five-
tier I/B/E/S ranking. This certainly works well for the recommendations issued before 2002 — when
the vast majority of the brokerage houses used a five-tier ratings system. However, as brokerage houses
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started using fewer tiers, one has to be cautious about inferences. For example, if there is only one
tier for the optimistic recommendations, there is not much sense in analyzing how a brokerage house
spreads upbeat recommendations between “strong buy” and “buy” categories.
The alternative is to use a reduced three-tier ratings system. A natural, direct mapping between
I/B/E/S classification and the three-tier system is readily available: “strong buy” and “buy” are
translated to optimistic, “hold” is translated to neutral, and “underperform” and “sell” are translated
to the pessimistic tier. Of course, this mapping is trivial for the recommendations issued by brokerage
houses that adopted three-tier systems. However, some brokerage houses were still using four- or five-
tier systems recently, as most of them did in the period before 2002. For recommendations coming
from these brokerage houses, the drawback of using the reduced system to analyze the pattern of
distribution is that information can be lost - e.g., no distinction is made between “strong buy” and
“buy” categories if they are all treated simply as optimistic.
In this paper, we do not take stands for one or another alternative. Since the objective here is
to understand how brokerage houses used recommendations, we try to use both methods of reporting
time-series distribution of recommendations. Consensus recommendations for each stock are thus
computed using two methods. For the alternative of relying on I/B/E/S classification, we first average
its outstanding recommendations at the end of the month, according to the convention [1=“strong
buy”, 2=“buy”, 3=“hold”, 4=“underperform”, and 5=“sell”], from each group of brokerage houses
(either big 10 or non—big 10). In the second step, we define the consensus recommendation using
the following convention on the resulting average: 4.2<=average<5 implies “sell”; 3.2<=average<4.2
implies “underperform”; 2.2<=average<3.2 implies “hold”; 1.2<=average<2.2 implies “buy”; and
average<1.2 implies “strong buy”.30
For the consensus based on the reduced three-tier model, we first map I/B/E/S classification of
the outstanding recommendations into a three-tier method using the direct mapping explained above.
Then, for each stock we average its outstanding recommendations using the convention [2=“buy”; or
“strong buy”; 3=“hold”; 4=“sell” or “underperform”]. In the last step, the consensus recommenda-
tion is established according to the following rule on the resulting average: 3.2<=average<4 implies
pessimistic; 2.2<=average<3.2 implies neutral; and average<2.2 implies optimistic.
30The general patterns on the distribution of monthly consensus recommendations are robust (1) to using an alternative
definition of consensus recommendation, e.g., setting 4.4<=average<=5 is “sell”; 3.4<=average<4.4 is “underperform”;
2.4<=average<3.4 is “hold”; 1.4<=average<2.4 is “buy”; and average<1.4 is “strong buy”, (2) to an alternative defini-
tion of consensus recommendation based on the median instead of mean recommendation, and (3) to whether we expand
the sample to include not only companies that have consensus recommendations available in the month from both groups
of big 10 and non—big 10 brokerage houses, but rather all the companies in the database. For brevity, we do not present
results using these alternatives.
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Figure 1:  Recommendation and Bias 
This figure describes analysts’ recommendation outcomes as a function of their bias. The cutoff points – c1 
and c2 – are the determinants of what recommendation will be issued. Their position is a function of the 
analysts’  level of optimism. As an analyst becomes more optimistic, the cutoff points shift to the left.  
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Figure 2. Monthly Distribution of Consensus of Outstanding Recommendations for Big 10 and Non–
Big 10 Brokerage Houses (Using a Five-Tier Ratings System) 
These figures present the monthly distribution of consensus of outstanding recommendations from big 10 
and non–big 10 brokerage houses regarding US common stocks using a five-tier rating system. Big 10 
brokerage house are those who participated in the Global Settlement. At the end of each month, the 
outstanding recommendations of each stock are averaged (according to the convention: 1=strong “buy”; 
2=“buy”; 3=“hold”; 4=“underperform”; and 5=“sell”) for each group of brokerage houses. We define the 
consensus recommendation according to the resulting average (using the convention: 4.2<=average<=5 is 
“sell”; 3.2<=average<4.2 is “underperform”; 2.2<=average<3.2 is “hold”; 1.2<=average<2.2 is “buy”; and 
average<1.2 is “strong buy”). Figure (a) plots the monthly distribution of the consensus recommendation 
for the group of big 10 brokerage houses and (b) for the group of non–big 10 brokerage houses. Results are 
reported for the period January 1998 through December 2004.  
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Figure 3. Monthly Distribution of Consensus of Outstanding Recommendations for Big 10 and Non–
Big 10 Brokerage Houses (Using a Three-Tier Ratings System) 
These figures present the monthly distribution of consensus of outstanding recommendations from big 10 
and non–big 10 brokerage houses regarding US common stocks using a three-tier rating system. Big 10 
brokerage houses are those who participated in the Global Settlement. At the end of each month, the 
outstanding recommendations of each stock are averaged (according to the convention: 2=“buy” or “strong 
buy”; 3=“hold”; 4=“sell” or “underperform”) for each group of brokerage houses. We define the consensus 
recommendation according to the resulting average (using the convention: 3.2<=average<4 is pessimistic; 
2.2<=average<3.2 is neutral; average<2.2 is optimistic). Figure (a) plots the monthly distribution of the 
consensus recommendation for the group of big 10 brokerage houses and (b) for the group of non–big 10 
brokerage houses. Results are reported for the period January 1998 through December 2004. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Recommendations, Brokerage Houses and Equity Offerings 
This table presents summary statistics on stock recommendations, brokerage houses and equity offerings 
during our sample period (November 2000 – December 2004). Pre-Reg is the period between November 
2000 and August 2002. Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. Panel A 
reports the number of stock recommendations, their mean, and their standard deviation. When calculating 
the mean and standard deviations, we assign stock recommendations a numeric value as follows: “strong 
buy” and “buy”=2, “hold”=3, “underperform” and “sell”=4. The hypothesis that there is no difference in 
means across periods is rejected at a significance level of less than 1%. Panel B presents summary statistics 
on brokerage houses’ participation in equity offerings. We report results aggregated for the big 10 
brokerage houses that participated in the Global Settlement as well as for the 20 next biggest brokerage 
houses (non-big10). For this purpose, the size of brokerage house is proxied by the number of 
recommendations issued throughout the period for US common stocks.  We consider a brokerage house to 
have participated in an equity offering if it was a lead underwriter in the offering. If there are joint lead 
underwriters, the participation variables (offerings and proceeds) are divided proportionally among all lead 
underwriters. Equity offerings include all IPO’s and SEO’s. Panel C reports summary statistics of various 
variables for sample firms that underwent an IPO or an SEO during the years 1998-2004.  We report 
statistics about the proceeds received in the equity offering (in millions of Dollars), the market 
capitalization as of the end of the fiscal year of the IPO or SEO (in millions of Dollars) and the book-to-
market ratio defined as book value of equity divided by market capitalization.  
 
Panel A: Stock Recommendations 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
N 89,029 64,383 
Mean  2.69 2.44 
Std.  0.67 0.57 
   
 
 
Panel B: Brokerage houses and equity offerings 
 % of all Equity Offerings % of all proceeds in equity offerings 
 Big 10 Non-big 10 Big 10 Non-big 10 
     
2000 58% 16% 78% 10% 
2001 71% 14% 87% 9% 
2002 63% 19% 85% 10% 
2003 60% 21% 80% 15% 
2004 61% 24% 79% 17% 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Equity offerings 
 2003-2004 2001-2002 1998-2000 2003-2004 2001-2002 1998-2000 
 IPO’s SEO’s 
N 123 107 331 541 430 365 
Proceeds (Mil $) 
Mean 216.1 348.6 162.70 170.4 199.9 271.1 
Median 96.0 114.0 72.30 98.1 110.1 147.4 
Std. 380.3 898.1 412.86 252.7 281.4 377.4 
Market Capitalization (Mil $) 
Mean 976.9 1777.9 2135.84 3264.1 3038.7 5799.8 
Median 444.3 489.9 693.57 1119.1 826.8 1136.3 
Std. 1682.0 6118.1 6149.35 18515.9 7650.5 26164.4 
Book-to-market ratio 
Mean 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.37 
Median 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.49 0.28 
Std. 0.23 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.49 0.59 
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Table 2. Distribution of Recommendations 
This table reports the frequency of stock recommendations taken from IBES Detail file during two time 
periods. The periods examined are: Pre-Reg (November 2000 - August 2002) and Post-Reg (September 
2002 – December 2004). In addition, the table reports the number of recommendations as well as their 
mean and standard deviation. When calculating the mean and standard deviations, stock recommendations 
are assigned a numeric value as follows: “Optimistic”=2, “Neutral”=3, and “Pessimistic” =4.  The 
hypothesis that there is no difference in means across periods is rejected at a level of less than 1%.  
 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
   
Optimistic 42.9% 60.7% 
Neutral 45.5% 35.1% 
Pessimistic 11.7% 4.2% 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics on Events of Changes of Ratings Systems 
This table reports summary statistics on the events of change in ratings system for the eight brokerage houses among the big 10 that changed their system in 
2002. For each event, the table shows the date it occurred, the number of stocks whose coverage was discontinued at the event, and the number of stocks with 
continued coverage. For each group of stocks, we report the percentage of stocks that were pessimistic, neutral or optimistic before the change, based on the 
ratings they received after the new ratings system was put into place (pessimistic, neutral or optimistic). Optimistic recommendations are “strong buy” and 
“buy”; Neutral recommendations are “hold”; and pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” 
 
Recommendations after the change →  Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic 
      Recommendation 
before the change 
  Recommendation 
before the change 
  Recommendation 
before the change 
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Broker 1 9-8-02 136 1019 20 0 4 80 15 38 1 0 60 40 42 0 0 2 98 
Broker 2 9-8-02 143 946 5 0 96 2 2 47 0 0 87 13 48 1 0 0 99 
Broker 3 9-8-02 80 916 28 0 8 77 15 38 0 1 37 62 34 0 0 3 97 
Broker 4 3-17-02 70 768 21 0 5 85 10 46 1 0 57 42 33 1 0 3 96 
Broker 5 9-25-02 128 743 26 1 4 71 24 45 0 0 33 67 29 0 0 1 98 
Broker 6 11-4-02 141 736 21 0 11 71 18 56 0 0 40 60 24 1 0 2 97 
Broker 7 8-4-02 97 791 27 0 2 78 20 40 0 0 28 72 33 0 0 2 98 
Broker 8 9-8-02 119 639 18 1 7 66 26 44 0 0 44 56 38 1 0 2 97 
    0.2 9 73.5 17.3  0.3 0.1 49.9 49.8  0.5 0 1.8 97.7 
Total 
 914 6,558 20%     44%     36%     
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Table 4. Panel Data Logistic Regressions to Explain Optimistic and Pessimistic Recommendations 
The table presents results of panel data logistic regressions with the dependent variable equaling 1 when a 
recommendation is optimistic (pessimistic) in model I (model II). Optimistic recommendations are “strong 
buy” and “buy”, and pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” BIG10 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who belongs to one of the big 10 
brokerage houses that were part of the Global Settlement. PRE and POST are indicator variables equaling 
1 when the recommendation is issued in the Pre-Reg or Post-Reg periods, respectively. Pre-Reg is the 
period between November 2000 and August 2002, and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and 
December 2004. PASTFIRMPERF is the size and industry-adjusted firm’s stock return in the six months 
prior to the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six months prior to 
the recommendation. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models are run with firm fixed-
effects. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Model I Model II 
 Dependent Variable:      
Prob (Rec=Pessimistic) 
Dependent Variable:      
Prob (Rec=Optimistic) 
 Coeff Odds Ratio Coeff Odds Ratio 
BIG10*PRE -0.299*** 0.74 -0.016 0.98 
 (0.061)  (0.022)  
PASTMKTPERF*PRE -1.583*** 0.21 0.125 1.13 
 (0.332)  (0.122)  
PASTFIRMPERF*PRE -0.890*** 0.41 0.675*** 1.96 
 (0.088)  (0.032)  
POST 1.461*** 4.31 -0.877*** 0.42 
 (0.048)  (0.019)  
BIG10*POST 0.443*** 1.56 -0.404*** 0.67 
 (0.030)  (0.020)  
PASTMKTPERF*POST 0.033 1.03 0.521*** 1.68 
 (0.109)  (0.069)  
PASTFIRMPERF*POST -0.276*** 0.76 0.172*** 1.19 
 (0.042)  (0.023)  
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Observations 92,943  114,246  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.05  
 
 44
Table 5. Price Reactions to Recommendations 
Panel A reports regression results of the basic regression: 
1 2 3* * * ,RET OPT NEUT PESS eα α α= + + +  
while Panel B reports regressions of an expanded model,  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7* _ * _ * _ * _ * _ * _ * _ .RET UP OPT RE OPT UP NEU DOWN NEU RE NEU DOWN PESS RE PESS eα α α α α α α= + + + + + + +  
The dependent variable, RET, is the size and industry-adjusted return measured over three different windows: (1) a three-day period centered around the issuance 
of the stock recommendation; (2) a six month window starting two days after the issuance of a recommendation and ending six months (121 trading days) after; 
(3) a period combining the previous two periods. In Panel A, the indicator variables equal 1 as follows: OPT=1 for “buy” and “strong buy”; NEU=1 for “hold”; 
PESS=1 for “underperform” and  “sell”. In Panel B, the indicator variables are UP_OPT=1 initiations of upgrades towards “strong buy” or “buy”; RE_OPT=1 
for reiterations of “strong buy” or “buy”; UP_NEU=1 for initiations or upgrades to “hold”; DOWN_NEU=1 for downgrades towards “hold”; and PESS=1 for 
“underperform” or “sell.” Each model is run separately for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg  is the period between November 2000 and August 2002 
and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. The P-value column reports p-values of tests of differences between the coefficients in 
the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A: Basic regression  
 Event return over [-1,+1] Post-event return over [+2,+122] Long-term return over [-1,+122] 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value 
OPT 0.0218*** 0.0122*** <0.0001 -0.0148*** -0.0058*** 0.0019 0.0099*** 0.0070*** 0.3189 
 (0.0005) (0.0007)  (0.0020) (0.0020)  (0.0021) (0.0020)  
NEU -0.0200*** -0.0506*** <0.0001 -0.0135*** -0.0136*** 0.9802 -0.0391*** -0.0591*** <0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0009)  (0.0022) (0.0027)  (0.0022) (0.0028)  
PESS -0.0398*** -0.0746*** <0.0001 0.0048 0.0041 0.9331 -0.0456*** -0.0667*** 0.0247 
 (0.0010) (0.0027)  (0.0042) (0.0082)  (0.0043) (0.0084)  
Observations 61,490 48,515  54,183 47,139  54,154 47,123  
R2 0.07 0.08  0.002 0.001  0.008 0.011  
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Panel B: Expanded regression 
 Event return over [-1,+1] Post-event return over [+2,+122] Long-term return over [-1,+122] 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value Post-Reg Pre-Reg P-value 
UP_OPT 0.0250*** 0.0151*** <0.0001 -0.0126*** -0.0043* 0.0077 0.0160*** 0.0110*** 0.1205 
 (0.0006) (0.0007)  (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0023) (0.0022)  
RE_OPT 0.0014 -0.0041** 0.0103 -0.0279*** -0.0141*** 0.0675 -0.0271*** -0.0156* 0.1356 
 (0.0014) (0.0017)  (0.0055) (0.0052)  (0.0057) (0.0053)  
UP_NEU 0.0018** -0.0200*** <0.0001 -0.0136*** -0.0089** 0.3480 -0.0116*** -0.0266*** 0.0033 
 (0.0007) (0.0014)  (0.0030) (0.0041)  (0.0031) (0.0041)  
DOWN_NEU -0.0440*** -0.0745*** <0.0001 -0.0134*** -0.0173*** 0.4143 -0.0706*** -0.0851*** 0.0030 
 (0.0008) (0.0012)  (0.0032) (0.0036)  (0.0033) (0.0037)  
PESS -0.0400*** -0.0746*** <0.0001  0.0048 0.0041 0.9331 -0.0456*** -0.0667*** 0.0245 
 (0.0010) (0.0027)  (0.0042) (0.0082)  (0.0043) (0.0084)  
Observations 61,490 48,515  54,183 47,139  54,154 47,123  
R2 0.10 0.10  0.002 0.001  0.012 0.014  
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Table 6.  Distribution of Recommendations for Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 
This table reports the frequency of stock recommendations in various groups of firms during the Pre-Reg 
and Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002, and Post-Reg is 
the period between September 2002 and December 2004. Panel A reports recommendations of affiliated 
analysts for IPO and SEO firms. Panel B reports recommendations by unaffiliated analysts for IPO and 
SEO firms. Affiliated analysts are employed by the lead underwriter(s) or the co-manager(s) of the equity 
offering. For IPO’s and SEO’s, we report stock recommendations that are issued in the window of 24 
months after the IPO or SEO date. The IPO’s and SEO’s reported occurred in the period starting in 
November 1998 and ending in December 2004. We extend the beginning of the sample period to 
November 1998 for the IPO’s and SEO’s to allow for inclusion of recommendations in the Pre-Reg period 
that refer to IPO’s and SEO’s that occurred before November 2000.  
Panel A: Affiliated analysts 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
Buy (%) 49.0 69.6 
Hold (%) 44.5 28.3 
Sell (%) 6.5 2.1 
Panel B: Unaffiliated analysts 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
Buy (%) 48.0 63.9 
Hold (%) 42.8 32.7 
Sell (%) 9.2 3.4 
Panel C: IPO 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
Buy (%) 56.0 64.8 
Hold (%) 39.4 32.4 
Sell (%) 4.6 2.8 
Panel D: SEO 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
Buy (%) 46.6 65.7 
Hold (%) 44.2 31.2 
Sell (%) 9.0 3.1 
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Table 7. Univariate Statistics on Stock Recommendation by Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 
This table reports the average stock recommendations issued by analysts for firms that have issued equity 
in an IPO or an SEO. Stock recommendations are assigned a numeric value as follows: “strong buy” or 
“buy”=2, “hold”=3, “underperform” or “sell”=4. The stock recommendations were issued in the Pre-Reg or 
Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002 and Post-Reg is the 
period between September 2002 and December 2004. Affiliated analysts are employed by the lead 
underwriter(s) or the co-manager(s) of the equity offering. Stock recommendations are issued in the 
window of 24 months after the IPO or SEO date. The table also reports: (1) t-statistics for difference in 
means, the test comparing the mean recommendation of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts within each 
period; (2) DIFF, the average difference between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations in each 
period deflated by the overall mean recommendation for that period; and (3) the p-value of test that 
compares the percentage difference between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations across periods.  
 
 Post-Reg Pre-Reg 
 Affiliated analysts 
Number of offerings 1147 1227 
Mean 2.60 2.28 
Median 2.55 2.14 
Std  0.43 0.35 
 Unaffiliated analysts 
Number of offerings 1147 1227 
Mean 2.48 2.46 
Median 2.46 2.43 
Std  0.39 0.39 
   
T-statistics for difference in  means -7.41 12.13 
   
DIFF 5.0% 
(8.21) 
-7.6% 
(-13.73) 
P-values of tests of differences in DIFF between periods 
Post-Reg vs. Pre-Reg <0.0001  
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Table 8. Panel Data Logistic Regressions Relating Optimism/Pessimism and Underwriting Relationships 
The table presents results of logistic regressions with the dependent variable equaling 1 when a recommendation is pessimistic (optimistic) in model I (model II).  
All models use firm fixed-effects. Optimistic recommendations are “strong buy” and “buy”, and pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” 
AFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the brokerage house issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in an equity offering for the 
firm in the 24 months prior to the recommendation announcement date. SEOIPO is an indicator variable equaling 1 if a firm has gone through an IPO or an SEO 
in the 24-months period prior to the recommendation. BIG10 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who belongs to one 
of the big 10 brokerage houses that were part of the Global Settlement. PASTFIRMPERF is the size and industry-adjusted firm’s stock return in the six months 
prior to the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six months prior to the recommendation. PRE and POST are indicator 
variables equaling 1 when the recommendation is issued respectively in the Pre-Reg or Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and 
August 2002 and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.    ***,**,* denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table Appears on the next page.  
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Table 8. (Continued) 
 Model I Model II 
 Prob (Rec=Pessimistic) Prob (Rec=Optimistic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
Coeff Odds 
Ratio 
AFF*PRE -0.692** 0.50 -0.568*** 0.57 -0.450*** 0.64 0.195*** 1.22 0.195*** 1.22 0.119** 1.12 
 (0.160)  (0.170)  (0.153)  (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.52)  
SEOIPO*PRE     -0.389*** 0.68     0.333*** 1.40 
     (0.074)      (0.031)  
BIG10*PRE   -0.331** 0.72 -0.289*** 0.75   0.020 1.02 -0.010 0.99 
   (0.140)  (0.058)    (0.049)  (0.021)  
PASTMKTPERF*PRE -1.897** 0.15 -1.893** 0.15 -3.047*** 0.05 0.855*** 2.35 0.872*** 2.39 0.646*** 1.91 
 (0.787)  (0.787)  (0.343)  (0.305)  (0.305)  (0.130)  
PASTFIRMPERF*PRE -0.512*** 0.60 -0.508*** 0.60 -0.819*** 0.44 0.875*** 2.40 0.873*** 2.40 0.715*** 2.04 
 (0.191)  (0.190)  (0.083)  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.031)  
POST 1.704** 5.50 1.475*** 4.37 1.555*** 4.73 -1.241*** 0.29 -1.129*** 0.32 -0.848*** 0.43 
 (0.131)  (0.136)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.020)  
AFF*POST -0.142 0.87 -0.389*** 0.68 -0.348*** 0.71 -0.150*** 0.86 0.041 1.04 0.038 1.04 
 (0.088)  (0.095)  (0.084)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.046)  
SEOIPO*POST     -0.229*** 0.80     0.037 1.04 
     (0.059)      (0.033)  
BIG10*POST   0.604*** 1.83 0.440*** 1.55   -0.511*** 0.60 -0.408*** 0.66 
   (0.085)  (0.030)    (0.050)  (0.020)  
PASTMKTPERF*POST -0.029 0.97 -0.067 0.94 -0.190 0.83 0.345* 1.41 0.371* 1.45 0.654*** 1.92 
 (0.336)  (0.337)  (0.116)  (0.192)  (0.193)  (0.075)  
PASTFIRMPERF*POST -0.228** 0.80 -0.233** 0.79 -0.281*** 0.75 0.165*** 1.18 0.166*** 1.18 0.172*** 1.18 
 (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.023)  
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 14,141  14,141  98,677  23,060  23,060  121,365  
Pseudo R2 0.05  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.05  
Hypothesis (p-values)             
AFF*PRE=AFF*POST 0.0023  0.3504  0.5557  <0.0001  0.0432  0.2344  
BIG10*PRE=BIG10*POST   <0.0001  <0.0001    <0.0001  <0.0001  
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Table 9.  Time Series Regression of the Differential Bias of Affiliated Analysts 
This table reports the results of  the monthly time-series regression:  
1 2 3 4 .t t t tDIFFM PASTMKTPERF GDP Proceeds REG eα β β β β= + + + + +  
The dependent variable, DIFFM, is the average difference between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations (for IPO 
and SEO firms) during month t deflated by the average recommendation during that month.  PASTMKTPERF is the 
cumulative market return in the six months preceding month t, GDP is the annualized growth in GDP in the quarter of 
month t, PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the total proceeds raised in IPO or SEO in the preceding month, POST is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 for months belonging to the Post-Reg period (September 2002 – December 2004). Newey-
West standard errors are in parentheses.  ***,** and * indicate the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.0322*** -0.0254*** 0.072 0.1079** 
 (0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0462) (0.0523) 
PASTMKTPERF -0.0071   0.6341* 
 (0.2622)   (0.3443) 
GDP  -0.0050**  -0.0081*** 
  (0.0019)  (0.0026) 
PROCEEDS   -0.0109** -0.0128** 
   (0.0051) (0.0054) 
POST 0.0226** 0.0344*** 0.0219** 0.0300** 
 (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0100) (0.0114) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.21 
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Table 10. Price Reactions to Recommendations Based on Underwriting Relationships 
This table presents tests of difference in price reactions, measured by size and industry-adjusted returns, to recommendations based on whether the analyst 
issuing the recommendation faced potential conflicts of interest. Panel A analyzes event reactions, i.e. returns over a three-day period centered around the 
issuance of the stock recommendation; Panel B analyzes post-event returns, i.e. returns over a six-month window starting two days after the issuance of a 
recommendation and ending six months (121 trading days) after that issuance.  In each panel, returns are reported separately for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg 
periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002, and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. In addition, 
three groups of recommendations are analyzed: (1) Recommendations for firms that have raised equity in the last 24 months and that were issued by affiliated 
analysts, i.e. analysts employed by a lead underwriter or a co-manager of the offering, (2) Recommendations for firms that have raised equity in the last 24 
months and that were not issued by affiliated analysts, (3) Recommendations for non-IPO/SEO firms, i.e. firms that did not raise equity in the last 24 months. 
The p-value columns report p-values of tests of differences between the returns of affiliated and non-affiliated analysts, for IPO/SEO firms, and the returns of 
affiliated analysts and non-affiliated analysts for non-IPO/SEO firms. *, **, *** represent significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 Post-Reg  Pre-Reg 
  
 
IPO/SEO firms 
Non-
IPO/SEO 
firms 
 
 
P-value 
  
 
IPO/SEO firms 
Non-
IPO/SEO 
firms 
 
 
P-value 
 Affiliated 
(1) 
Unaffiliated 
(2) 
(3) (1)=(2) (1)=(3)  Affiliated 
(1) 
Unaffiliated 
(2) 
 
(3) 
(1)=(2) (1)=(3) 
Panel A: Event returns (window [-1,+1]) 
Optimistic 0.0169** 0.0152*** 0.0196*** 0.3798 0.1012  -0.0014 0.0021 0.0125*** 0.1981 <.0001 
 (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0005)    (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0007)   
Neutral -0.0301*** -0.0176*** -0.0182*** <.0001 <.0001  -0.1047*** -0.0714*** -0.0373*** <.0001 <.0001 
 (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0005)    (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0009)   
Pessimistic -0.0501*** -0.0422*** -0.0323*** 0.1113 <.0001  -0.1008*** -0.0800*** -0.0533*** 0.1375 0.0003 
 (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.0009)    (0.0129) (0.0055) (0.0027)   
Obs. 59,675    47,474   
Panel B:  Long-Term Returns (window [+2,+122]) 
Optimistic -0.0017*** -0.0165*** -0.0182*** 0.9628 0.8490  -0.0280*** -0.0836*** 0.0153*** <.0001 <.0001 
 (0.0065) (0.0049) (0.0020)    (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0021)   
Neutral -0.0235*** -0.0227*** -0.0181*** 0.9306 0.4797  -0.1069*** -0.1241*** 0.0128*** 0.1535 <.0001 
 (0.0075) (0.0053) (0.0020)    (0.0107) (0.0056) (0.0027)   
Pessimistic -0.0275 0.0013 -0.0159*** 0.1613 0.5172  -0.0808** -0.1124*** -0.0030 0.4696 0.0413 
 (0.0174) (0.0109) (0.0038)    (0.0402) (0.0172) (0.0083)   
Obs. 52,647    46,167   
 
